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ABSTRACT
Measuring the causal impact of state behavior on outcomes is one of the biggest methodological
challenges in the field of political science, for two reasons: behavior is generally endogenous, and
the threat of unobserved variables that confound the relationship between behavior and outcomes
is pervasive. Matching methods, widely considered to be the state of the art in causal inference in
political science, are generally ill-suited to inference in the presence of unobserved confounders.
Heckman-style multiple-equation models offer a solution to this problem; however, they rely on
functional form assumptions that can produce substantial bias in estimates of average treatment
effects. We describe a category of models, flexible simultaneous likelihood models, that account
for both features of the data while avoiding reliance on rigid functional form assumptions. We then
assess these models’ performance in a series of neutral simulations, in which they produce substan-
tial (55% to >90%) reduction in bias relative to competing models. Finally, we demonstrate their
utility in a reanalysis of Simmons’ (2000) classic study of the impact of Article VIII commitment
on compliance with the IMF’s currency-restriction regime.*
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1. INTRODUCTION
The study of political science has undergone a methodological renaissance in the past 20 years.
A field that was once content to base its conclusions on garden-variety logit and probit results
has created or imported methods for modeling strategic interaction (Signorino 1999; Smith 1999;
Lewis 2003; c.f. Carrubba, Yuen and Zorn 2007), selection bias (Sartori, 2003; von Stein, 2005;
Boehmke, Morey and Shannon, 2006; Chiba, Martin and Stevenson, 2014), split-population or
partial-observability models (Xiang, 2010; Braumoeller and Carson, 2011), zero-inflated or rare
events data (King and Zeng, 2001; Bagozzi, Hill, Moore and Mukherjee, 2015), network analysis
(Dorussen and Ward, 2008; Hafner-Burton and Kahler, 2009; Maoz, 2009; Cranmer, Desmarais
and Menninga, 2012), and more.
Unfortunately, observational studies in political science continue to be plagued by the problem
of endogeneity. Endogeneity occurs when an omitted variable or variables confounds the rela-
tionship between cause and effect, thereby introducing bias into the estimate of the causal effect.
Contrary to what most practitioners seem to believe, simply adding omitted confounders to the
right-hand side of a linear model in an observational study does not ensure that endogeneity bias
has been eliminated. And while the number of experimental studies in political science is on the
rise, the field is still dominated by analyses of observational data, in which unmeasured and mis-
modeled confounders are a threat to inference in even the most well-designed studies.
Fortunately, political methodologists have increasingly focused on the development of methods
designed to account for it. While scholars during the so-called “age of regression” (Morgan and
Winship, 2007, ch. 1) were often content to base their conclusions on simple correlational methods
such as regression, hazard models, logit, and the like, the 21st century has brought with it a renewed
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appreciation of the hazards of basing causal claims on observational data. Except in the case of
randomized experiments, one can rarely assume that variables of interest are truly exogenous—
or, put differently, that assignment to a “treatment condition” of interest, like commitment to an
institution, is truly randomized. Greater appreciation of this point has brought with it an increased
interest in experiments as well as a renewed focus on statistical techniques designed to account for
the confounding variables that represent a major threat to causal inference in observational studies.
In this paper we elaborate one such methodology, flexible simultaneous likelihood models, that
we believe conveys a host of advantages to students of political science. By virtue of their structure,
these models can account for endogeneity. Unlike matching methods, the current state of the art
for causal inference in political science, they can also account for the unmeasured confounders that
plague observational studies. Finally, relative to traditional simultaneous likelihood models, they
are far less reliant on rigid distributional assumptions that can bias results.
To establish the validity of these models, we use a series of simulations to explore their ability
to reduce endogeneity bias. To illustrate their utility, we then take up the debate among Simmons
(2000), von Stein (2005), and Simmons and Hopkins (2005) on the impact of formal commitment
to Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement on states’ willingness
to refrain from currency restrictions. By loosening the parametric assumptions of the recursive
bivariate probit model and allowing for unobserved confounders we show both that von Stein was
correct to argue that Article VIII produces a screening effect and that Simmons was correct to argue
that it produces a constraining effect. Moreover, we demonstrate that the constraining effect, while
smaller than the original study suggested, is much more persistent.
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2. THE PROBLEM OF ENDOGENEITY
Endogeneity occurs when one or more omitted variables confounds the relationship between cause
and effect, rendering estimates of the causal effect problematic (Kish, 1959). Because confound-
ing is a potential threat to inference whenever the causal variable is itself caused by something
else, and because virtually everything in social science is caused by something else, endogeneity
is ubiquitous. For instance, democracy is said to cause peace (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Bueno de
Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and Smith, 1999; Bausch, 2015), but democracy itself is thought to
be endogenous to such variables as GDP, trade, and (most troublingly) peace (Gates, Knutsen and
Moses, 1996; Reuveny and Li, 2003). Similarly, military alliances are widely accepted as a tool
that can reduce the risk of conflict (Leeds, 2003; Johnson and Leeds, 2011; Benson, 2011; Fang,
Johnson and Leeds, 2014), but both alliance formation and conflicts are driven by the (typically
unobserved) interests and security environment of the states involved. Failing to account for these
interests leads to bias in the estimation of the impact of alliances on conflict (Levy, 1981; Bearce,
Flanagan and Floros, 2006). In the same vein, poor economic conditions are thought to increase the
risk of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana, 2004; Freytag, Krüger, Meierrieks and Schnei-
der, 2011; Meierrieks and Gries, 2012), but important variables such as political freedom affect
both the state of the economy and the incidence of terrorism (Grier and Tullock, 1989; Krieger and
Meierrieks, 2011). Even weather, often used as an instrumental variable because of its indepen-
dence from human influence, has become endogenous to anthropogenic climate change in studies
of civil conflict (see, e.g., Tir and Stinnett 2012 and Theisen 2012).
In statistical terms, the endogeneity of a given variablemanifests itself as an association between
that variable and the error term. For example, in the linear regression y = X +  each of the
3
variables in design matrix X is assumed to be independent of . If some omitted variable, w,
influences both y and one of the right-hand-side variables, x1,w is said to confound the relationship
between y and x1 because x1 is no longer uncorrelated with . In this case the estimator for  will
be biased and inconsistent, with 1 (the impact of x1 on y) being the most affected (Wooldridge,
2010). The same logic applies to techniques like logit and probit that are designed to handle binary
dependent variables.
Unfortunately, there is no perfect answer to the problem of endogeneity in observational studies.
As a theoretical solution, Manski (1990) did derive a nonparametric technique that calculates the
bounds within which the average treatment effect of an endogenous causal variable must lie, but
those bounds are typically so broad as to be of little use to practitioners. It is worth noting, however,
that any solution that offers a more precise answer than Manski’s must leverage some assumptions
in order to do so. In general, the technique that is best able to recover the causal effect of a treatment
with both accuracy and precision should be the technique whose assumptions are best-suited to the
circumstances. In the following sections we argue that flexible simultaneous likelihood methods
are well-suited to the challenging circumstances that are typically found in the study of political
science.
2.1. Existing Solutions
While the majority of political scientists are aware of the problem of endogeneity, at least in prin-
ciple, most seem to believe that it can be taken care of simply by adding observed confounding
variables to the right-hand side of a linear, logit, or probit regression (see, e.g., Simmons 2000,
829, fn 25 and Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Unfortunately, doing so generally does not resolve
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the problem. While it is technically not impossible to address endogeneity bias in this manner,
these technique assume both that all possible confounders have been measured and included in
the equation and that the functional form of their relationship to y has been correctly specified—
assumptions that will almost certainly not be met in practice.
A simple substantive example from the voting literature illustrates this point. In a classic study,
Bartels (2000) models voting behavior in American national elections as a function of partisan iden-
tification, which is meant to measure a voter’s long-term political affiliation. He admits, however,
that the characteristics of a particular candidate might drive both reported partisanship and vote in
a given election. It is not difficult to imagine other variables (age, socioeconomic status, the state
of the economy, and so on) that might have an impact on both partisanship and vote. Unless all
of those variables can be accounted for, the causal impact of partisanship on vote choice will be
biased due to unobserved confounding. And with observational data, it is typically impossible to
account for those variables with any degree of certainty.
The desire to account for confounding variables’ effects on estimates of causal impact has led
researchers to explore instrumental variables approaches (e.g., Simmons 2009). These typically
take the linear form
y = 1x1 + fXg[ 1x1] + ;
x1 = Z + ;
where fXg[ 1x1] excludes the component 1x1 from X and Z is a design matrix. This ap-
proach is generally preferable to ordinary single-equation models in that it explicitly addresses the
endogeneity of x1 (Angrist and Krueger, 2001). It can create some practical difficulties in that
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it relies on the existence of an instrument—a variable in Z that is independent of the unobserved
confounders (i.e., independent of the error terms), independent of y conditional on the unobserved
and unobserved confounders, and associated with x1. Instruments can be problematic if they are
invalid, in that they are correlated with the error term, , in the outcome equation, or if they are only
weakly correlated with the endogenous variable x1 (Murray, 2006). Another, less commonly noted
problem with instrumental variable estimators is that their ability to identify causal effects typically
hinges on their functional form, and functional form assumptions are often made arbitrarily:
Given the model, least squares and its variants can be used to estimate parameters and
to decide whether or not these are zero. However, the model cannot in general be
regarded as given, because current social science theory does not provide the requisite
level of technical detail for deriving specifications. (Freedman and Sekhon, 2010, 46)
As we demonstrate in our simulations below, the bias introduced by even minor differences in
functional form assumptions can be substantial.
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that practitioners have turned to matching methods to estimate
causal effects (Simmons and Hopkins, 2005; Gilligan and Sergenti, 2008; Hill, 2010; Lupu, 2013).
Matching is a simple and powerful methodology for dealing with confounding variables. The basic
idea behind it is to match each “treated” unit (x1 = 1) with one “control” unit (x1 = 0) (or vice
versa) based on observed confounders. In this way the matched data resemble, as much as possible,
observations from a natural experiment in which one comparable set of units was given a treatment
while the other constituted a control. Once matching has been used to achieve balance, the impact
of x1 on y can be measured via a simple difference of means, as long as the identifying assumption,
selection on observables, is met. Because the technique is nonparametric, concerns about functional
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form assumptions are eliminated—a feature that is often emphasized by the method’s proponents.
2.2. The Threat of Unobserved Confounders
Matching methods are a compelling way to cut through the thicket of problems surrounding in-
strumental variable approaches. They are not without problems of their own, however. Foremost
among them is the assumption that all confounders have been measured and incorporated into the
analysis—an assumption known as “selection on observables.” To the extent that this assumption
has been recognized as being potentially problematic, the solution is typically to measure unmea-
sured confounders and include them in the analysis (see, e.g., Simmons and Hopkins 2005; Lupu
2013). As Keele (2015, 322) notes in a recent review, however, “selection on observables is a very
strong assumption. It is often difficult to imagine that selection on observables is plausible in many
contexts.”
The selection-on-observables assumption is especially problematic in the context of observa-
tional studies in political science, for two reasons. First, measures of quantities of interest are often
either approximated using existing but tenuously related data (“proxies”) or simply omitted due
to the cost of additional data collection. Accordingly, accounting for all unobserved confounders,
even in principle, is challenging at best. Second, using matching alone, there is no way to know
whether unobserved confounders remain.
Indeed, ensuring that the selection-on-observables assumption has been met can prove difficult
even in actual experiments. Consider, for example, the role that unobserved confounders played in
a significant controversy from the American politics literature on the efficacy of get-out-the-vote
efforts prior to the 1998 election. Gerber and Green (2000) carried out a field experiment involving
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30,000 registered voters in New Haven, Connecticut and concluded that, while personal canvass-
ing increased voter turnout, telephone calls did not. The experimental nature of the study should
have ruled out the influence of unobserved confounders. However, the discovery of inadvertent
deviations from the authors’ experimental protocols led Imai (2005) to re-balance the data using
propensity score matching and conclude that telephone calls do in fact increase voter turnout, by
five percentage points.
Imai’s strategy was explicitly designed to rectify the deviations from randomness in the exper-
imental design and thereby eliminate the influence of unobserved confounders. Yet when Gerber
and Green (2005) used Imai’s matching technique to compare the turnout rate of people in the
treatment group who were not called to that of people in the control group who were not called,
they found something surprising. Because neither group was contacted, assignment to treatment
should be irrelevant to the outcome—in other words, the causal impact must be zero. Yet Gerber
and Green found a statistically significant, 5.6% difference in turnout rates between people in the
two groups. In other words, as the authors put it, “placing phone numbers on a list and not calling
them depresses turnout” (310).
Finding a causal effect where one could not possibly exist was an elegant way of demonstrat-
ing that, even under near-ideal circumstances, statistical adjustment that relied on selection on
observables for identification had failed to produce a credible estimate of the causal effect. As
Sekhon (2009, 502-503) concludes in a review of the controversy, “it is clear that the selection-on-
observables assumption is not valid in this case.” More generally, he argues that
[s]election on observables and other identifying assumptions not guaranteed by the
design should be considered incorrect unless compelling evidence to the contrary is
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provided. (503)
Consider the import of this conclusion for students of politics. The overwhelming majority of our
research designs are observational, and absent a natural experiment such designs cannot make the
selection on observables assumption remotely plausible in and of themselves. That leaves users
of matching techniques with the second-best strategy of measuring all conceivable confounders,
including them in the analysis, and hoping that they have all been accounted for. The odds that
they have been, however, would seem to be extraordinarily low in any realistic application. This
problem gets even worse if we consider individual subfields: If students of American politics,
conducting an experiment in which the subjects are individuals, the treatment is a telephone call,
and the outcome is voting cannot meet the selection-on-observables assumption, how can students
of comparative politics or international relations ever hope to do so?
All of these considerations point toward a straightforward conclusion: causal inference in polit-
ical science would benefit greatly from a methodology that accounts for unobserved confounders.
2.3. Accounting for Unobservables
Fortunately for students of political science, it is possible to account for the impact of unobserved
confounders, which manifests itself as an association between the error terms of the treatment and
outcome equations. Multiple-equation instrumental variable approaches accomplish this, though
they rely on generally arbitrary functional form assumptions. Moreover, in the case of binary de-
pendent and endogenous right-hand-side variables, which are ubiquitous in political science, the
two-stage estimation technique typical of such studies has been shown to be deeply problematic
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(Freedman, Collier, Sekhon and Stark, 2010). A more promising approach is the use of simultane-
ous likelihood methods—in particular, multiple equation probit models with endogenous dummy
regressors, also known as recursive models. These models address endogeneity directly by es-
timating the coefficients in two (or more) equations simultaneously. They allow one to capture
the impact of unobserved confounders by modeling the correlation between the error terms of the
equations.
Despite these advantages, simultaneous likelihood methods are not often used in studies of
politics (for exceptions see von Stein 2005, McLaughlin Mitchell and Hensel 2007, and Gartner
2011). This fact may to some extent be due to their relative obscurity and the recent popularity
of matching methods within the discipline. A more serious concern, however, has to do with their
reliance on distributional and functional form assumptions and their sensitivity to violations of those
assumptions (Winship and Mare, 1992; Sartori, 2003; Simmons and Hopkins, 2005; Freedman and
Sekhon, 2010). Given the number of distributional assumptions in standard simultaneous likelihood
methods, this sensitivity can be nontrivial. The classic recursive bivariate probit model assumes that
the latent errors of the equations follow a standard bivariate normal distribution with correlation
 2 [ 1; 1], does not allow for flexible functional dependence of the responses on covariates,
and only makes use of symmetric (e.g., probit) link functions. Mismodeled dependencies that
appear, for instance, in the tails of the distribution linking the two equations (that a linear measure
of association can not fully capture), undetected nonlinear covariate-response relationships and
mismodeled probabilities related to the outcomes of two equations can have severe consequences
for parameter estimation (e.g., Chib and Greenberg, 2007; Little, 1985; Monfardini and Radice,
2008; Marra and Radice, 2011, 2015).
Fortunately, each of these assumptions can be relaxed using flexible likelihood-based methods.
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As the next section will demonstrate, doing so holds great promise for causal inference under the
challenging circumstances that typically characterize the study of politics: pervasive endogeneity,
binary dependent and endogenous right-hand-side variables, and excluded confounders.
3. FLEXIBLE SIMULTANEOUS LIKELIHOOD METHODS
The key to relaxing the bivariate normal distributional assumption of simultaneous likelihood mod-
els lies in using a function, called a copula, which separates the univariate marginal distribution
functions from the dependence structure between the dependent variables. In a simple bivariate pro-
bit model, for example, the twomarginal distributions are Normal cumulative density functions—as
in a standard probit—and the copula that describes the correlation of the error terms of the depen-
dent variables is bivariate Normal.
Once the structure of the multivariate distribution has been broken down in this manner, it is
possible to relax each of the distributional assumptions in turn. The assumption that the marginal
distributions are cumulative Normal can be relaxed, for example, by utilizing logit or complemen-
tary log-log distributions. The assumption that the copula is multivariate Normal can be relaxed in
any number of ways. While these modifications should ideally follow concrete theory regarding
the likely impact of unobservable confounders, they can also be implemented in alternative models
as a way of assessing the fragility of one’s findings and reducing the bias of the resulting estimator.
For example, to model covariate-response relationships in a more flexible way Chib and Green-
berg (2007) and Marra and Radice (2011) introduced theoretically founded Bayesian and likeli-
hood estimation approaches based on penalized regression splines, thereby allowing for a number
of different flexible covariate-response structures. Examples in political science include Chiba,
11
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Figure 1: Examples of copulae implemented in SemiParBIVProbit that can be used to capture
symmetric or asymmetric dependences among error terms of endogenous variables in a simultane-
ous likelihood model. A narrowing of the copula indicates stronger dependence; so, for example,
the Clayton copula describes a strong dependence between negative shocks to the endogenous vari-
ables, while the Joe copula describes a strong dependence between positive shocks. The Gaussian,
Frank, FGM, Student-t, and AMH copulae allow for both positive and negative dependence. AMH
and Clayton are asymmetric, with a strong lower tail dependence for Clayton but a weaker upper tail
dependence. The converse is true for the Gumbel and Joe copulae. The copulae that do not allow
for both positive and negative dependence (Clayton, Gumbel, and Joe) can be rotated to change the
direction of the tail dependence. Specifically, rotation by 180 degrees leads to the survival copula,
while rotation by 90 and 270 degrees allows for negative dependence, which is not possible with
the non-rotated and survival versions.
Metternich and Ward (2015) and Fukumoto (2015). To deal with the problem of non-linear depen-
dence between outcomes, Winkelmann (2012) discussed a modification of the recursive bivariate
probit which introduces non-normal dependence between the marginal distributions of the two
equations using the Frank and Clayton copulae. Radice, Marra and Wojtys (2015) took a more
general approach and extended the procedures discussed in Marra and Radice (2011) and Winkel-
mann (2012) to make it possible to deal simultaneously with unobserved confounding, flexible
covariate effects and non-linear dependencies between two binary responses. In particular, they
12
generalized the approach based on the assumption of bivariate normality presented in Marra and
Radice (2011) by allowing for non-normal dependencies between the two equations through Clay-
ton, Frank, Student-t, Gumbel, Joe, Ali-Mikhail-Haq (AMH) and Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern cop-
ulae and the rotated versions of the asymmetric copulae (Clayton, Gumbel and Joe).1 For this work
we extended the scope of the modeling approach by also allowing for logit and complementary
log-log link functions—an innovation in its own right. Radice, Marra and Wojtys (2015) provided
a theoretical argumentation related to the asymptotic behavior of the proposed estimator and the
ensuing formula to calculate the average treatment effect (ATE). Importantly, efficient and stable
algorithms implementing the ideas above have been made available through the R package Semi-
ParBIVProbit (Marra and Radice, 2016). The model can be formulated as follows:
y = 1x1 + f1
 fXg[ x1]+ ;
x1 = f2 (Z) + ;
where  and  are allowed to follow one of the Normal, logistic or Gumbel distributions with
zero mean and variance equal to 1 (hence yielding probit, logit and cloglog link functions, respec-
tively), the observed outcome variables are determined by the classic rules y = 1(y > 0) and x1 =
1(x1 > 0); f1 and f2 represent flexible functions of the variables in fXg[ x1] and Z. For instance,
f1
 fXg[ x1] could be equal to 2x2+ s(x3)+ s(x3)x2, where x2 is a binary predictor with impact
2, s(x3) is a smooth function of the continuous covariate x3, and s(x3)x2 is an interaction term.
The probability that y = 1 and x1 = 1 is defined as P(y = 1; x1 = 1) = C(Fy(yjy);Fx(xjx); )
where C is a two-place copula function, Fy(yjy) and Fx(xjx) are cumulative distribution func-
1Note that it is also possible to model positive and negative tail dependencies simultaneously by combining asym-
metric copulae; this gives rise to a switching model. For instance, mixing the Clayton copula with its 90 degree
(counter-clockwise) rotation allows one to model positive and negative tail dependence.The options available for the
asymmetric copulae are: standard and rotated 90 degrees copulae, standard and rotated 270 degrees copulae, survival
and rotated 90 degrees copulae and survival and rotated 270 degrees copulae (Marra and Radice, 2017).
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tions (Normal, logistic or Gumbel) of y and x1 taking values in (0,1) and  an association parameter
(see Figure 1 for some copula shapes2). The marginal distribution parameters, y and x, are re-
lated to covariates and regression coefficients via link functions g: gy(y) = 1x1+f1
 fXg[ x1],
gx(x) = f2 (Z).  can also be modeled through a flexible linear predictor like those used for mod-
eling y and x1: since the strength of the association between the treatment and outcome equations
may vary across groups of observations (specifically, across years),  = g 1 (f3(W)), where g 1 is
a one-to-one transformation which ensures that the dependence parameter lies in its range and W
is a design matrix (e.g., Radice, Marra and Wojtys, 2015).
It is important to note that, because of the model’s complex covariate structure, the ATE cannot
be inferred in a classical way. Inference is best achieved by utilizing a useful connection between
Bayesian andmaximum likelihood penalized regression spline estimators (Marra andWood, 2012).
This implies that intervals with close-to-nominal frequentist coverage probabilities for non-linear
functions of themodel coefficients (e.g., ATE) can be conveniently obtained by posterior simulation
(Radice, Marra and Wojtys, 2015). This has the obvious advantage of avoiding computationally
expensive bootstrap methods, which would hinder the model building process that is pivotal for
practical modeling.
4. SIMULATIONS
The aim of this section is to use simulations to assess the empirical effectiveness of the copula
recursive bivariate model for binary outcomes. Because simulated results are of marginal interest
2Contour plots of copulae with standard normal margins for data simulated using a Kendall’s  of 0:5 for all copulae
except AMH, where a value of 1/3 (the maximum allowed for this copula) was used.
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when the data-generating process conforms to the assumptions of the authors’ preferred model
and the parameters can be set to degrade the performance of its competitors, we focus mostly on
simulations in which none of the models captures the correct distributional assumptions. The goal
is to compare model performance under what we take to be the most likely scenario for political
scientists attempting causal inference: at least one confounder is omitted, the marginal distributions
and dependence structure are unknown, and the goal is to recover the best (i.e., least biased and
lowest RMSE) estimate of the ATE.
In the following simulations a binary instrument, two continuous observed confounders, one
continuous unobserved confounder, a binary treatment and a binary outcome are denoted as z3, z1,
z4, z2, x and y, respectively. We constructed the responses y and x using several distributions for the
unobserved confounding variable z2 (standard Normal, Student’s t with four degrees of freedom,
2 with one degree of freedom and uniform[-3, 3]) and used logit link functions for the treatment
and outcome variable, giving four simulation scenarios in total. Variable z3 was simulated with
2 categories (0 and 1) with Pr(z3 = 1) = 0:5. Variables z1 and z4 were generated from uniform
distributions over [0,1]. Non-linear covariate effects between y and z1 and z4, and between x and
z1 and z4 were also introduced. The coefficient of the unobserved confounder z2 was set to  0:85
in the treatment equation. The sample size was 1000. Each scenario was replicated 250 times.
Following a reviewer’s suggestion, we conducted further simulations with different values of the
coefficient of z2 in order to assess the size of bias and RMSE in relation to the importance of the
unobserved confounder. A full description of the simulations is found in the Appendix.
Table 1 compares the bias and root mean squared error (RMSE) for the ATE from a univariate
model (i.e., a recursive model that assumes uncorrelated errors and therefore adjusts only on ob-
served covariates), genetic matching (an approach that matches on individual observed covariates
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using an automated search algorithm to balance covariates), a recursive bivariate model with Gaus-
sian copula (Gaussian C in the table), and a flexible recursive bivariate model in which the preferred
model is selected by AIC (this is referred to as Flexible C).3 Note that the recursive bivariate model
with Gaussian copula and probit link functions corresponds to a bivariate probit.
Given the existence of an unobserved confounder, we should expect the first two models, both
of which assume selection on observables, to perform poorly, and they do: bias ranges from 32%–
121% and 41%–145%, respectively, and RMSE from 0.17–0.40 and 0.22–0.49.
Moving to a standard recursive bivariate model with a Gaussian copula, we can see that sim-
ply allowing for unobserved confounders dramatically reduces both bias and RMSE relative to the
models that assume selection on observables: decreases in average bias of 90% or more are not un-
common. By contrast, allowing different marginal distributions across recursive bivariate models
with a Gaussian copula does virtually nothing to decrease bias or improve RMSE.4
Use of the flexible copula model improves our estimates even further. On the whole, use of
the flexible copula model results in a reduction by about 55% of the bias of the ATE relative to a
standard recursive model with the same marginal distributions. This difference is greatest in the
case of non-Gaussian errors, where the performance of the traditional recursive bivariate model
worsens significantly whereas that of the flexible copula model remains reasonably consistent. In
these cases, reduction of the bias of the ATE averages about 64%. Differences in ATE estimates
between Gaussian and flexible copula models were generally statistically significant at p = 0:05.5
3An anonymous reviewer suggested that we include the results from a flexible recursive bivariate model in which
matching had been used as a pre-processing step. While the model was not designed to be combined with matching,
we were nevertheless curious enough to try it. The bivariate model with matching gave more biased estimates of the
ATE than the bivariate model without matching, though it was a significant improvement over matching alone.
4Experiments with more flexible marginal distributions that required the estimation of additional parameters—
skewed probit, for example—resulted in little improvement but produced substantial identification issues.
5The only exceptions are the logit-logit and probit-probit cases with N (0; 1) errors, where the assumptions of the
conventional recursive bivariate model most closely reflected the data-generating process.
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Link Logit-Logit Probit-Probit Cloglog-Cloglog
Distribution N (0; 1) t4 21 U( 3; 3) N (0; 1) t4 21 U( 3; 3) N (0; 1) t4 21 U( 3; 3)
% Bias
M
o
d
e
l
Univariate 33 53 42 119 32 53 41 119 33 43 40 121
Matching 42 90 80 145 42 89 80 144 41 87 80 143
Gaussian C 3 3 12 11 2 4 13 6 3 4 14 10
Flexible C 3 0 5 4 2 1 6 1 6 0 7 4
RMSE
M
o
d
e
l
Univariate 0.17 0.25 0.24 0.39 0.17 0.25 0.24 0.39 0.17 0.25 0.23 0.40
Matching 0.23 0.44 0.46 0.49 0.22 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.22 0.43 0.46 0.48
Gaussian C 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07
Flexible C 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08
Table 1: % Percentage biases and RMSEs for the average treatment effect of an endogenous right-hand-side variable, estimated on
data simulated using logit links for the treatment and outcome variable, and normal, Student’s t, 2 and uniform distributions for the
unobserved confounder, when setting the coefficient of the unobserved confounder to  0:85 in the treatment equation. The percentage
bias is defined as the average difference between the estimator and the true parameter divided by the true parameter. The RMSE is the
square root of the mean of the squared deviations of the ATE estimates from their true values. Bias tells us how well or poorly the
estimator does on average in estimating the ATE, while the RMSE reflects both the bias and the precision of the estimator. For both
statistics lower numbers indicate a better-performing estimator; examining both helps to diagnose whether a poorly performing estimator
suffers from imprecision or bias or both. The 250 simulated datasets were used to fit Gaussian, Frank, Clayton90, Clayton270, Joe90,
Joe270, Gumbel90 and Gumbel270 copulae with logit, probit and complementary-log-log link functions for the treatment and outcome
variable. The recursive bivariate model with Gaussian copula is denoted as Gaussian C and the flexible recursive bivariate model in
which the copula is selected by AIC is refereed to as Flexible C.
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Although these conclusions are valid for the simulation settings considered here, it cannot be
determined a prioriwhether relaxing the distributional assumptions will lead to dramatically differ-
ent estimated ATE as the true structure in the data is unknown. However, these results do suggest
that there are a variety of scenarios in which incorrect distributional assumptions lead to biased
results and in which a flexible recursive bivariate model can substantially mitigate this bias.
In order to illustrate the utility of the flexible recursive bivariate model in practice, we now turn
to an example from the literature on international institutions: the debate over the impact of ratifi-
cation of Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement on compliance.
5. THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
To highlight the utility of these models in political science, we have reexamined the debate over
Article VIII ratification and compliance that was first explored by Simmons (2000). This is an
ideal example to examine for two reasons: its structure—endogenous ratification as a determinant
of compliance—is quite typical of studies of international institutions (as well as for regimes, in-
ternational organizations, and state behavior more generally), and in the course of the debate the
original study’s conclusions have been reexamined using both simultaneous likelihood methods
(von Stein, 2005) and matching methods (Simmons and Hopkins, 2005).
At issue is the impact of treaty commitment on compliance, using the example of Article VIII
of the International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement. Article VIII stipulates that signatories
must keep their current accounts free from restrictions. Individual governments may be tempted
to restrict current accounts to realize short-term gains, such as developmental objectives or the
easing of balance-of-payment difficulties, but doing so is inimical to the longer-term collective
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goal of open foreign exchange. Simmons chose to explore Article VIII because its effects are
uncontaminated by external considerations: commitment to Article VIII is voluntary, and there are
neither positive incentives to commit nor sanctions for noncompliance (Simmons, 2000, 820). The
interesting question for students of institutions is whether, and to what extent, formal commitment
to Article VIII increases compliance by reducing the probability that a state will impose current-
accounts restrictions.
Clearly, Article VIII ratification cannot be viewed as a random “treatment.” Simmons (2000)
recognizes the endogeneity of Article VIII status but, citing the absence of a good instrument (fn.
25), utilizes a logit model on cross-sectional time-series data. In doing so, she leverages the insight
of Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998), who pointed out that annual cross-series time-section data are
equivalent to grouped duration data. Following their recommendations, she accounts for temporal
dependency using two time splines of a measure of the time elapsed since the state’s last currency
restriction. She finds that Article VIII commitments increase the probability of compliance by up
to 27% in the first year after commitment, though the effect subsequently diminishes and fades to
insignificance after about five years.
In a followup study, von Stein (2005) argues that screening effects, rather than constraining
effects, could easily account for Simmons’ results—that is, that states preferentially opt in to treaties
with which they are already willing to comply. She also underscores the endogeneity of Article
VIII status and argues that unmeasured confounders—that is, variables that have an impact both on
commitment and compliance—are potentially problematic for Simmons’ results. Von Stein points
to Vreeland (2003, 5-8), who lists two examples of unobservables that could confound the impact of
IMF programs on outcomes: “political will,” or the resolve of countries that are determined both to
make a commitment in the first place and, subsequently, to uphold it; and trust in government, which
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provides the societal support necessary both to permit a government to make an IMF commitment
and to weather its possible adverse repercussions.
To estimate the impact of Article VIII commitment net of these unobservables, von Stein derives
an original dual-selection model based on a standard bivariate probit in which the probability of
restriction is modeled separately for signatories and non-signatories—that is, states are “selected”
into either signatory or nonsignatory status. Like Simmons, von Stein uses time splines to account
for temporal dependence (fn. 12). In addition, she utilizes two dummy variables in the selection
equation that are equal to 1 if the state in question restricted current accounts in the present or the
previous year, respectively, and equal to 0 otherwise, to ensure that the coefficient estimates are
“based on the variables’ effects before and when states sign, but not after” (618).
Based on her results, von Stein concludes that Simmons’ estimate of the impact of treaty com-
mitment on compliance is overly optimistic—roughly double what it should be. Moreover, this
reduced effect can no longer be distinguished from zero at standard levels of statistical signifi-
cance. Von Stein also finds a statistically significant correlation between the error terms of the
selection and outcome equations for signatories, implying that the unmeasured confounders that
produce commitment also produce compliance. Intriguingly, the correlation of the error terms of
the equations for non-signatories is not statistically significant, implying that the converse is not
true.
Simmons and Hopkins (2005) reply by pointing to the well-known frailty of “Heckman-style”
models in the face of violations of their distributional assumptions (624-627). Moreover, they
point out that the dummy variables used by von Stein to restrict the selection equation to the pre-
commitment period are problematic, both in that they induce quasi-perfect separation and in that
they account for almost all of the difference between von Stein’s estimate of the effect of treaty
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commitment and Simmons’ original estimate (626).
Simmons and Hopkins’ solution to the larger selection-on-unobservables issue involves the-
orizing and measuring the unobserved confounders—specifically, using capital account openness
and GATT/WTOmembership as proxies for unobserved political will—and then using matching to
calculate the ATE of commitment to Article VIII. While their matching-based estimate of the ATE
corresponds well with the estimate from Simmons’ original paper, they admit in the final paragraph
that,
[t]o be sure, von Stein’s critique is about nonrandom assignment to treatment owing to
both observable and unobservable selection factors, and matching assumes that there is
no selection on unobserved covariates. Certainly, though, matching can play a role in
narrowing the range of possible unobservables, just as we demonstrated earlier. (630)
While this statement is true, it does raise important questions. How can we be reasonably certain
that all unmeasured confounders have been accounted for? If unobserved confounders remain, to
what extent does their omission bias the matching-based estimate of the ATE? And how can we
obtain separate estimates of the screening and constraining effects of Article VIII commitment,
rather than the impact of commitment net of both?
Rather than attempting to address these questions within the context of matching, we instead
address Simmons and Hopkins’ concerns about the impact of rigid functional-form assumptions in
simultaneous likelihood models by relaxing those assumptions.
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5.1. Analysis and Results
To explore the screening and constraining impacts of Article VIII, we utilized a flexible recursive
bivariate binary model on the commitment and compliance variables from Simmons and Hopkins’
reanalysis. We use the Ali-Mikhail-Haq (AMH) copula with two logit marginals: this model pro-
duced the lowest AIC score of any marginal-copula combination,6 and a Clarke test (Clarke, 2007)
indicated that it was to be preferred over the closest contender, a model with logit marginals and a
Gaussian copula.7 We account for temporal dependence with smoothing splines to capture the non-
linear relationships between both years of IMF membership and commitment and years since last
restriction and compliance. The exclusion restriction is clearly satisfied: universality and regional
norms, in particular, are unlikely to produce currency restriction except via Article VIII commit-
ment. Utilizing alternative marginal distributions produced no noticeable improvement in fit and
empirical findings.
The results of the analysis, displayed in Table 2, comport very well with theoretical expecta-
tions and findings from Simmons’ original study. Of more than 20 coefficients, only one—Change
in GDP, an economic control in the Commitment equation—both changes sign and becomes statis-
tically significant. Two variables in the Restriction equation, Change in GDP and Reserves/GDP,
retain their predicted sign but become statistically insignificant, while two others—Reserve Volatil-
ity in the Commitment equation and Openness in the Restriction equation—retain their predicted
sign but become statistically significant. Leaving aside the impact of Article VIII commitment on
restriction for the moment, then, the remaining theoretical conclusions regarding the determinants
6We explored all nine possible pairs of logit, probit, and cloglog marginals with 17 different copulas each: rotated
and unrotated Clayton, Joe, and Gumbel copulas (a total of 12) as well as Frank, AMH, FGM, Student’s t, and Gaussian.
7The AMH copula, like the Gaussian, can capture both positive and negative associations among error terms—a
feature which, as we describe below, is important in the context of this model.
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Article VIII Commitment Restriction
Variable  s.e.  s.e.
Article VIII Commitment  1:109 0:227
Terms of Trade Volatility 0:461 0:142
Balance of Payments/GDP  0:018 0:008
Use of Fund Credits  0:372 0:157 1:059 0:180
Openness 0:025 0:002  0:006 0:003
Change in GDP  0:027 0:012  0:012 0:017
Reserves/GDP  0:909 0:964 0:589 0:928
Democracy 0:016 0:009 0:017 0:014
GATT/WTO Member  0:698 0:164  0:149 0:208
Universality 0:025 0:054
Regional Norm 0:065 0:004
Flexible Exchange Rate  0:247 0:180
Surveillance  0:620 0:265
GNP/Capita 0:000 0:000
Reserve Volatility  1:168 0:146
Year  0:028 0:041
s(Years of IMF Membership)y 3:07 14:1
Years Since Last Restriction z
Intercept  6:625 1:736 0:874 0:509
 s.e.
s(Years Since Commitment)y 1:000 4:299
Intercept 0:136 0:357
p < 0:1, p < 0:05, p < 0:01.
y Reported spline values are effective degrees of freedom and Chi-square, respectively.
z Ten coefficients (for dummy variables for one year, two years, …, 10 years) omitted to
save space. Coefficients ranged from -3.964 to -5.436; all were significant at p < 0:01.
n = 2,288, average  = -0.024 (-0.457, 0.635), total edf = 39.1.
Table 2: Determinants of Article VIII ratification and compliance.
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Figure 2: Estimated values of , the parameter that reflects the strength of the correlation between
the error terms of the commitment and restriction equations, for non-signatories and signatories.
of commitment and restriction are largely similar to those in the original study.
The third equation, at bottom, models , the parameter that captures the strength of the corre-
lation of the errors between the two equations, as a function of years since (or, if negative, prior
to) commitment to Article VIII. The goal is to capture either transient shocks around the time of
signing—the temporary rise of an unusually sympathetic government, say, or the presence of propi-
tious short-term conditions—or longer-term internalization of (or disenchantment with) the norms
of the treaty. The results show a weakly positive correlation, and a plot of the spline function (not
shown) shows a linear relationship.
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As Figure 2 demonstrates, the impact of unobserved confounders varies markedly between
non-signatories and signatories. As we might expect, unobserved “shocks” were negatively cor-
related among non-signatories, indicating that unobserved confounders that decreased (increased)
the propensity to commit also increased (decreased) the probability of currency restriction. The
asymmetric tail of the AMH copula indicates that this association is especially strong. Among sig-
natories, we see a positive correlation among shocks: unobserved confounders that increased the
propensity to commit increased the probability of currency restriction. This result suggests that
some unmodeled variable (changes in government, perhaps) decreases post-commitment enthusi-
asm for compliance. The fact that unobserved confounders pull in opposite directions across the
two groups of states is one of the important conclusions that would have been missed by a less flex-
ible standard recursive bivariate probit model. As we will soon see, it turns out to be an important
one.
Using the chosen model, we calculate the ATE of Article VIII commitment, given by
1
n
nX
i=1
(^1 + f^1
 fXg[ x1];i)  (f^1  fXg[ x1];i);
where  is the cumulative distribution function of a standard logistic distribution. This formula
captures the difference between the probability of restriction given Article VIII commitment (the
first term) and the probability of restriction given no Article VIII commitment (the second term)
for each observation i, summed across all n observations. We generate a 95% confidence interval
for the ATE via posterior simulation.
The screening hypothesis, in which the states that sign are states for which compliance involves
very little change in behavior, implies that there is a systematic difference in the average treatment
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effect between signatories and non-signatories. To the extent that it holds, we should expect to see
that the ATE among non-signatories is systematically greater than it is among signatories, indicating
that they would have to change their behavior more radically than would signatories in order to
comply. The compliance hypothesis, by contrast, suggests that the average treatment effect for
signatories should be positive and statistically significant.
The ATE for signatories is found to be 0:059. That is, the average effect of signing Article VIII
is to reduce the risk of current account restriction (that is, increase the probability of compliance)
by 5.9%. These results suggest that signing on to Article VIII has a significant, if modest, impact
on state behavior. For non-signatories, the model produces an ATE of  0:105—nearly twice that
of signatories.8 This difference, illustrated on the left of Figure 3, provides strong evidence of a
screening effect. The states that sign are fundamentally different from the states that do not: in the
counterfactual world in which these non-signatories were to sign, doing so would require a much
more substantial change in behavior. In short, these results support von Stein’s contention that
Article VIII screens states that have a higher cost of compliance.
To explore the impact of commitment on compliance over time, we disaggregate the ATE by
year since signing (Figure 3, right-hand graph). As one might expect, the effect of the treaty is
not constant over time. When unobservables are properly accounted for in the bivariate model, the
effect of Article VIII commitment shrinks to about a 10% increase in the probability of restriction
immediately after signing.
What is much more striking is the fact that the ATE remains relatively constant, between 5%
and 10%, for an entire decade after signing. While the results of Simmons’ original model (2000,
8The difference between the two distributions, as gauged by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, is highly statistically
significant (D = 0.7909, p < 0:00).
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Figure 3: Average treatment effect of commitment to Article VIII, for signatories and non-
signatories. The Y-axis represents the ATE measured in terms of percentage change in the proba-
bility of compliance. For the screening effect, the shaded areas represent the distributions of treat-
ment effects for signatories (bottom) and non-signatories (top), while for the constraining effect
the shaded area represents 95% confidence intervals.
831) suggested that the impact of signing drops below 5% after three years and fades to substantive
and statistical insignificance after five years, our results indicate a much more robust and lasting
effect—welcome news for students of international institutions.
The impact of unobserved confounders is worth a brief note as well. By comparing the ATE
estimates from our final model with those of a univariate model—i.e., a model that assumes zero
correlation between error terms—, we can see that unobserved confounders have little impact on
the ATE for signatories: the increase in the probability of compliance associated with commitment
was 5.9% in the full model and 5.7% in the univariate model. Unobserved confounders had a much
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more substantial impact on the ATE for non-signatories, however: the ATE for non-signatories was
10.5% in the full model but only 5.7% in the univariate model. Given that Simmons and Hopkins
went to a substantial amount of effort to include as many causes of compliance as possible but paid
less theoretical attention to variables that might produce a screening effect, while von Stein relied
on the error terms in her model to capture screening effects, this result makes quite a bit of sense.
In all, the results suggest that both Simmons and von Stein were correct. Simmons was correct
about the main finding: commitment to Article VIII does increase compliance, and its impact is
far more lasting than previously thought. Von Stein was correct about the magnitude of the aver-
age treatment effect (if not its statistical significance or duration) and about the existence both of
significant screening effects and of important unobserved confounders.
5.2. Discussion
The malleability of the simultaneous flexible likelihood model and its ability to capture the impact
of omitted confounders was essential in many ways to this analysis. As our simulations demon-
strate, the ability to try out a wide range of functional form combinations and adjudicate among
them based on fit significantly improves the accuracy and precision of our estimate of the ATE—an
estimate that differs significantly from those of past studies both in magnitude and duration of im-
pact. The ability to model the association between “shocks” to commitment and compliance, and
the ability to allow that association to vary in magnitude and direction depending on signatory sta-
tus, turned out to be essential for obtaining good estimates of the magnitude of screening effects in
particular. Finally, although our estimates of constraining effects were similar to those that would
have been obtained from a simple recursive bivariate logit model with no correlation among errors,
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there is no way that we could have known that without estimating both models and comparing their
results.
6. CONCLUSION
Formany years, political scientists seeking to engage in causal inference have been forced to choose
which unpalatable assumptions they wished to embrace in the face of endogeneity issues: they
could utilize a potentially weak or invalid instrument, assume selection on observables, or embrace
simultaneous likelihoodmethods with restrictive functional form assumptions. Nearly all statistical
empirical work in political science suffers from these problems. Flexible simultaneous likelihood
models represent a considerable improvement over this status quo. These models are capable of
capturing the impact of unmeasured confounders, and their flexible functional form assumptions
significantly reduce bias in the estimate of average treatment effects. As our results demonstrate,
the increased flexibility of these models can greatly enhance our understanding of political science.
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APPENDIX
1.1. Simulation details
The R code chunk below was used to generate the scenario with probit link for y and normal dis-
tribution for z2, with coefficient of z2 set to -0.85:
## set seed and sample size
set.seed(0)
n=1000
## observed confounders
z1 <- runif(n)
z4 <- runif(n)
# unobserved confounder
z2 <- rnorm(n)
## instrumental variable
z3 <- rbinom(n,1,0.5)
## non-linearities
f1 <- function(x) cos(pi*2*x) + sin(pi*x)
f2 <- function(x) x + exp(-30*(x-0.5)^2)
## treatment assignment
beta <- -0.85
prob.treated <-plogis(-0.5 + f1(z1) beta*z2 + 3*z3 + 1.3*z4)
x <- rbinom(n, 1, prob.treated)
## potential outcomes
p0 <- plogis(-3.5 + f2(z1) + 2*z2 -0.8*z4)
p1 <- plogis( 0.5 + f2(z1) + 2*z2 -0.8*z4)
y0 <- rbinom(n, 1, p0)
y1 <- rbinom(n, 1, p1)
## observed outcomes
y <- y0
y[x==1] <- y1[x==1]
1
To allow z2 to be Student’s t with four degrees of freedom, 2 with one degree of freedom and
uniform[-3, 3], and the parameter of the unobserved confounder to have different impacts in the
treatment equation, the above R code can be easily modified by replacing z2 <- rnorm(n) with z2
<- rt(n, df=2), z2 <- rchisq(n, df=1) or z2 <- runif(n, -3, 3) and replacing beta <- -0.85 with
beta <- -1.5, beta <- 0, beta <- 0.85, or beta <- 1.5.
1.2. Further simulation results
Results for additional simulation settings (where the value of coefficient of the unobserved con-
founder in the treatment equation has been set to 0 and -1.5) are reported in Tables 1 and 2. When
the coefficient is set to 0 (i.e. no unobserved confounding problem), then, as expected, the uni-
variate model and matching perform the best with the former being more efficient than the latter.
Although the copula models (Gaussian and Frank copulae) show a poorer performance, the mag-
nitudes of their bias and RMSE are comparable. When the problem of unobserved confounding
becomes more severe (the coefficient is set to -1.5), then copula models still perform predictably
well whereas the univariate and matching approaches deteriorate as compared to the case where
the confounding issue is less severe. Though we do not report the results here, we observed similar
patterns when setting the value of the coefficient of z2 to 0.85 and 1.5.
2
Link Logit-Logit Probit-Probit Cloglog-Cloglog
Distribution N (0; 1) t4 21 U( 3; 3) N (0; 1) t4 21 U( 3; 3) N (0; 1) t4 21 U( 3; 3)
% Bias
M
o
d
e
l
Univariate 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 2
Matching 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 4
Flexible G C 2 3 0 9 1 3 1 8 3 4 3 10
Flexible F C 2 3 1 9 1 3 1 8 2 4 4 10
RMSE
M
o
d
e
l
Univariate 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
Matching 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08
Flexible G C 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09
Flexible F C 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10
Table 1: % Percentage biases and RMSEs for the average treatment effect of an endogenous right-hand-side variable, estimated on
data simulated using logit links for the treatment and outcome variable and normal, Student’s t, 2 and uniform distributions for the
unobserved confounder, when setting the coefficient of the unobserved confounder to 0 in the treatment equation. The 250 simulated
datasets were used to fit Gaussian and Frank copulae, detonated as Flexible G C and Flexible F C, respectively, with logit, probit and
complementary-log-log link functions for the treatment and outcome variable.
3
Link Logit-Logit Probit-Probit Cloglog-Cloglog
Distribution N (0; 1) t4 21 U( 3; 3) N (0; 1) t4 21 U( 3; 3) N (0; 1) t4 21 U( 3; 3)
% Bias
M
o
d
e
l
Univariate 37 58 45 135 37 58 41 135 37 58 42 135
Matching 50 92 88 157 51 91 89 157 50 90 89 156
Flexible G C 2 2 8 8 2 3 8 8 3 3 9 9
Flexible F C 1 5 9 3 1 6 10 2 1 6 11 3
% RMSE
M
o
d
e
l
Univariate 0.19 0.27 0.30 0.44 0.19 0.27 0.25 0.44 0.19 0.27 0.25 0.44
Matching 0.26 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.26 0.46 0.50 0.52 0.26 0.47 0.49 0.52
Flexible G C 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06
Flexible F C 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05
Table 2: % Percentage biases and RMSEs for the average treatment effect of an endogenous right-hand-side variable, estimated on
data simulated using logit links for the treatment and outcome variable and normal, Student’s t, 2 and uniform distributions for the
unobserved confounder, when setting the coefficient of the unobserved confounder to 1:5 in the treatment equation. The 250 simulated
datasets were used to fit Gaussian and Frank copulae, detonated as Flexible G C and Flexible F C, respectively, with logit, probit and
complementary-log-log link functions for the treatment and outcome variable.
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